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Executive Summary
There are 89 States and territories that have
some form of current or historical interest
in the tropical tuna fisheries (i.e., bigeye,
yellowfin, and skipjack) of the Western and
Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO).1 However,
only 14 of them ultimately control access
to the most productive fishing grounds and
the vessels that fish in them. All but one of
these States are full members of the Western
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(WCPFC), and all have some form of vested
interest in the long-term sustainability of
some part of the tropical tuna fisheries.

14 States or territories control
access to the most productive
tuna fishing grounds in the world.
Understanding their interests is
essential to driving successful
conservation and management
outcomes at WCPFC.
This paper studies the mix of interests in the
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries. These interests
are likely to influence each delegation’s national
interest and drive negotiating positions to
support or oppose certain measures, depending
upon how they affect that State’s interests.
Given the complex nature of the WCPO tuna
fisheries and their conservation challenges, it
is important to understand these interests and
consider how States might compromise their
interests in an equitable manner that allows

for the adoption of a new conservation and
management measure for tropical tuna.
The largest markets in the world for fresh,
frozen, smoked, and canned tuna are the
United States, Japan, and Europe.2 All of
these markets, to some degree, depend upon
the WCPO tuna fisheries for their supply.
In addition, markets in developing States
are looking towards domestically produced
and imported canned tuna to counter food
insecurity and as a cheap form of protein.3 In
this context, conservation and management
decisions within the WCPFC, particularly in
regard to skipjack and purse-seine fisheries,
can quickly affect global markets and have
significant repercussions on prices.4
The WCPFC faces an increasingly complex and
urgent challenge. The scientific assessments
clearly indicate that urgent action is required
to address overfishing and reduce fishing
mortality for bigeye, halt any increases in
fishing mortality for yellowfin, reduce fishing
mortality of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin,
and develop precautionary limits for skipjack.
Despite its mandate, the WCPFC has repeatedly
failed to adopt conservation and management
measures that are sufficient to meet its own
Scientific Committee’s recommendations.
The conservation challenge is complicated by
the multigear, multispecies, and multinational
characteristics of the WCPO tropical tuna
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fisheries. Skipjack, yellowfin, and bigeye are all
caught by each gear in a tightly intermeshed
manner that is difficult, if not impossible,
to separate. Consequently, the fishery is
inherently challenging to manage. This
complexity is exacerbated by the substantially
different biological characteristics of skipjack,
yellowfin, and bigeye (i.e., highly resilient and
productive skipjack compared to the longerlived and less-productive bigeye). Further,
since the mid-1990s, various studies have
suggested that the profitability of the WCPO
tuna fisheries could be increased through
significant changes in fleet composition
and reductions in total fishing effort.5

For the WCPFC to resolve
the threat to bigeye, it must limit
longline catches and restrict the
operation of purse-seine vessels
that are targeting highly productive
skipjack that are not currently
threatened by overfishing.
For the WCPFC to resolve the threat to bigeye,
it must limit longline catches and restrict
the operation of purse-seine vessels that
are targeting highly productive skipjack that
are not currently threatened by overfishing.
However, purse-seine fleets will receive
little or no long-term sustainability benefit
or increase in profitability if bigeye stocks
rebuild. Longline fleets will directly benefit
from conservation measures that rebuild
bigeye stocks, thus increasing profits by
improving catch per unit of effort (CPUE).
Figures 1 through 4 (immediately following
executive summary) illustrate the fisheries
interests of all States that reported catches
between 2008 and 2010. The proportion of
their benefit from each species and gear is
charted horizontally, based on the value of
the catch taken by their registered vessels or
from waters under their national jurisdiction.

Figure 1 illustrates the balance of interests for
coastal States from skipjack to bigeye, while
Figure 2 does the same for flag States. Figure
3 illustrates the balance of interests for coastal
States from purse seine to longline, while 4
does the same for flag States.
From this analysis, the following interests can
be identified:
Seven of the core 14 States can be loosely
referred to as ‘purse-seine/skipjack States’,
six of which are part of the group of coastal
States that dominate the control of the most
productive purse-seine fishing grounds
(Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Nauru,
Federated States of Micronesia, and the
Solomon Islands). These six States enjoy
far greater benefits from the WCPO skipjack
fisheries (compared to bigeye and yellowfin),
purse-seine fisheries (compared to longline
and other gears), and licensing revenue for
access to their exclusive economic zones
(EEZs) (compared to their vessel registry
interests). These six States also have strong
interests in the welfare of their artisanal
coastal communities and aspirations to
develop and expand their participation in the
WCPO tuna fisheries.
The seventh of the purse-seine/skipjack States
is the United States. The United States is
dominated by its vessel registry interests,
which provide more than 80% of the benefits
that the United States enjoys from the WCPO
tuna fisheries (compared to the catch from
within its EEZ). Although far less significant in
the context of its overall interest, the United
States catches substantial amounts of bigeye
through its Hawaiian longline fisheries. As
an established distant water fishing nation
(DWFN), the United States has a strong
interest in protecting its historical level of
activity. The significance of its distant water
fleet also gives the United States an interest
in distributing the burden of conservation
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across all waters of the WCPO without special
regard for EEZs or archipelagic waters.
The remaining seven core States have fishing
interests across multiple gears, mostly
longline and purse seine. They are Japan, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, South
Korea, China, and the Marshall Islands. These
States must balance the costs and benefits
of conservation measures across their own
domestic interests when considering how
best to address conservation challenges.
These tensions are further complicated by
broader interests held by Indonesia, the
Philippines, and Japan in pole and line and
other gears.
The European Union has a critical market
interest and a far less significant distant
water fishing interest. Nevertheless, its
limited fishing interest in the WCPO tropical
tuna fisheries appears to be dominated by
purse-seine fleets that are highly dependent
on fish aggregating devices (FADs). The EU
does not represent any significant coastal
State interests (the Pacific island territories
of France and the United Kingdom are not
represented by the EU). Consequently, the EU
has an interest in supporting measures that
distribute the burden of conservation across
all waters of the WCPO without special regard
for coastal State interests or development
aspirations. Japan and the United States are
also critical market States for the WCPO tuna
fisheries but must balance these interests
with significant distant water fishing interests
and coastal interests.
In addition, the positions of those coastal
States with mixed interests in multiple
gears and species are further complicated
by their significant flag State interests. This
is particularly a challenge for Indonesia and
the Philippines, which have extensive vessel
interests that extend into the high seas. This
significantly undermines any motivation that
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these States may have in supporting high
seas closures or conservation measures that
prioritise conservation reductions on the high
seas over waters under national jurisdictions.
Given current levels of overfishing, a
sustainable solution for bigeye will require
that some or all States compromise their
interests and carry some of the conservation
burden. This raises important questions
that are fundamental to conservation and
management negotiations. It is arguable
that overfishing of bigeye will continue
until the WCPFC negotiates a measure that
transparently recognises the benefits and
costs, and equitably distributes the burden of
conservation in a manner consistent with the
WCPF Convention. It appears unlikely that the
WCPFC will be able to develop and negotiate
such a response across its plenary table without
first agreeing on some form of framework for
distributing the conservation burden. This
framework will need to allow for a differential
application of measures that recognises the
divergent interests while allowing for sufficient
reductions in fishing mortality. This should be
within the limits set by precautionary reference
points and guided by agreed harvest control
rules that recognise the need to equitably
distribute the burden of conservation.
Consequently, this paper suggests that the
WCPFC should prioritise the adoption of target
and limit reference points, and establish a new
‘discussion’ on how to resolve the distribution
of the conservation burden. This paper
suggests that ultimately the WCPFC should
establish a transparent framework that defines
the parameters and values for how it distributes
the conservation burden. This framework
should necessarily balance the interests of its
members in a politically acceptable manner that
is in accordance with international principles
and standards relating to conservation and
sustainable development.

FIGURE 1. Scale of Interests for Coastal States: From Bigeye to Skipjack (average 2008–2010)
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FIGURE 2. Scale of Interests for Flag States: From Bigeye to Skipjack (average 2008–2010)
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FIGURE 3. Scale of Interests for Coastal States: From Purse Seine to Longline (average 2008–2010)
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Introduction

“The first instinct of most governments in the international arena
is to protect and promote their own national interests.”6
								U.S. Ambassador David Balton
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Oceans and Fisheries

The Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO)
stretches approximately 6,000 nautical miles,
from the archipelagos of Southeast Asia to the
remote atolls of Kiribati in the Central Pacific.
This vast ocean is home to the world’s most
productive tuna fisheries, supplying global
markets with skipjack, bigeye, yellowfin and
albacore worth approximately US$4.6 billion.7
These fisheries are critically different from other
tuna fisheries in that 87% of all reported WCPO
tuna catches are harvested from waters under
national jurisdiction.8 Unlike the high seas tuna
fisheries of the Eastern Pacific, Indian Ocean
and North Atlantic, the WCPO tuna fisheries
are predominantly owned by a small group of
developing coastal States.
In December 2004, the region came together
and celebrated the establishment of the
Western and Central Pacific Fisheries
Commission (WCPFC) in Pohnpei, Federated
States of Micronesia.9 All of the key
coastal and distant water fishing States
collaborated to establish the world’s most
advanced regional fisheries management
organisation with a mandate to ensure the
long-term conservation and sustainable
use of the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries.
Seven years later, the members of the WCPFC
now face a critical juncture. In order to fulfil
their mandate and ensure the long-term
conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO
tropical tuna fisheries, they must cooperate to
reduce overfishing in complex fisheries that
catch multiple species, utilise multiple gears,
and occur in multiple jurisdictions.

This paper studies the mix of interests in the
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries in order to better
understand how these interests might influence
the WCPFC’s ability to adopt measures for
bigeye and yellowfin. As noted by Balton, the
benefits from a fishery are a key influence on
national negotiating positions.10 They influence
each delegation’s national interest and drive
negotiating positions to support or oppose
certain measures depending upon how they
impact on that State’s various interests. For
the purposes of this analysis, the tropical
tuna fisheries are defined as all fisheries in
the WCPO that catch skipjack (Katsuwonus
pelamis), bigeye (Thunnus obesus) or yellowfin
(Thunnus albacares), regardless of whether the
species is targeted or taken incidentally.
This analysis studies interests that are
directly relevant to potential conservation and
management measures. These include the
interests and influences that each participating
State has in particular species (bigeye,
yellowfin, and skipjack) and particular gears
(purse seine, longline), and more broadly,
interests and influences related to access to
fishing grounds; fishing vessels; food security;
development aspirations; and markets.
The study analyses all reported catches
from within the WCPFC Statistical Area (the
perceived range of the stocks) and is based
on the most recent data that were available at
the time of the study. Data are sourced from
the 2011 WCPFC Yearbook Excel database,11
the Value of WCPO Tuna Fisheries Excel
database,12 and the WCPFC overview paper
on the WCPO tuna fisheries.13 This covers
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2008–10 catches that were reported in 2010 and
published in 2011. Unless otherwise indicated,
all subsequent figures were developed by the
author using these databases.
It is important to note that these data sets
are likely to contain inaccuracies due to gaps
in data, non-reporting, and misreporting of
catches by vessels and States.14 In addition,
the undefined western and northern
boundaries of the WCPFC also create
uncertainties in these data sets as not all
coastal States within the WCPFC Statistical
Area consistently provide tuna catch reports
to the WCPFC or the Secretariat of the
Pacific Community (SPC) for fisheries within
their waters under national jurisdiction.

The interests identified in the following analysis
do not necessarily reflect the overall ‘national
interest’ of a State. Many of the identified States
will have multiple and diverse interests. While
one consideration below might suggest that a
State will oppose any conservation measure
that negatively impacts its interests, another
consideration might suggest otherwise. Such
States will need to balance their interests when
considering potential management responses.
This paper does not pretend to determine the
individual ‘national interest’ for each State. This
is simply beyond the scope of a small report.
Rather, the paper identifies some interests
that may impact on, and complicate, the
negotiation, adoption, and implementation of
conservation and management measures for
bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack.
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Part One: The WCPO Tuna Fisheries
A critical management challenge for the
WCPFC is the unsustainably high level of
fishing activity in the WCPO tropical tuna
fisheries that catch skipjack, bigeye, and
yellowfin either intentionally as a target species
or incidentally. Catches in the WCPO tuna
fisheries have increased since the WCPFC’s
founding Convention was adopted in 2000,
with record catches for each of the tropical
tuna species in recent years. The record catch
for skipjack was 1,821,770 metric tonnes (mt)
in 2009, while the 2008 catches of yellowfin
and bigeye were the highest on record
(541,262 and 157,173 mt, respectively).15
Three types of fisheries are primarily
responsible for most commercial catches
of WCPO tuna. Purse seine is by far the
most significant, catching approximately
1,820,844 mt in 2010. Longline fisheries
caught 239,853 mt and pole and line caught
171,604 mt. Various other gears caught
143,829 mt (largely various fleets in Indonesia
and the Philippines, with some small troll
catches in New Zealand and Japan).16
Skipjack, bigeye, and yellowfin are distributed
throughout the tropical and subtropical

waters of the Pacific Ocean and migrate
across numerous international boundaries.
Consequently, they require international
cooperation to ensure effective management
across multiple jurisdictions. Skipjack and
yellowfin also exhibit sufficient levels of
residency to justify conservation measures that
apply differentiated limits and regulations at
subregional and national levels.17
All three tropical tuna species are highly
productive and fast-growing.18 Skipjack are
by far the most productive, with a biomass
estimated to be greater than that of bigeye and
yellowfin combined.19 Skipjack grow rapidly and
sexually mature at around one year, and can
weigh 5 kilograms and reach 80 cm in length by
age 4.20 Most captures occur on skipjack ages 1
to 3.21 Most skipjack have had an opportunity to
reproduce before capture, further strengthening
the stock’s resilience to fishing.22 Yellowfin can
weigh 30 kg and reach 120 cm by the time they
reach maturity at approximately 2 years.23 Most
captures occur on yellowfin 1 to 6 years old.24
Bigeye are longer-lived and slower to mature,
taking approximately three years.25 Most
captures occur on bigeye 1 to 10 years old.26

Status of skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis)
In 2011, the stock assessment for skipjack
concluded that overfishing was not occurring,
nor was the stock in an overfished state.27
However, the WCPFC Scientific Committee
advised that catch rates will decline as the
skipjack stock is fished down to levels near the
biomass capable of producing the maximum
sustainable yield (BMSY). The Scientific
Committee also noted recent rapid changes in
fishing mortality and biomass indicators relative
to MSY, and recommended that the WCPFC
consider developing restrictions on fishing for
skipjack to limit declines in catch rates.28 Such
declines would likely impact on the economic
efficiency of the fishery and its profitability.

The assessments noted that the purse-seine
fishery dominates equatorial catches of
skipjack, but scientists continued to struggle
to understand the factors impacting on purseseine CPUE. The use of FADs and rapid changes
in technology and catchability complicated
efforts to define units of effort and better
understand the fishery.29 In addition, there are
questions about whether the current use of
FADs undermines the potential yield of the stock
due to the higher catches of small skipjack and
concerns that the use of FADs may negatively
affect the health and distribution of skipjack.30
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Status of yellowfin (Thunnus albacares)
In 2011, stock assessments indicated that
the entire WCPO yellowfin stock was not
experiencing overfishing. However, the
assessments did note that significant regional
differences existed in levels of fishing mortality,
exploitation rates, and depletion and that the
spawning biomass in the western equatorial
region (where 81% of the total yellowfin catch is
taken) had declined to approximately 31% of its
unexploited level.31

the highest impact on yellowfin stocks, while
purse-seine fishing on free-swimming schools
has a moderate impact. These fisheries are
having high impacts in the western equatorial
region and, more generally, across the WCPO.
The assessment also noted that Japanese
coastal pole-and-line and purse-seine fisheries
have a significant impact on biomass levels in
their home region.32

The WCPFC Scientific Committee subsequently
advised that yellowfin stocks are fully exploited
and recommended against increases in fishing
mortality. They indicated that Philippine and
Indonesian surface fisheries have high levels
of juvenile fishing mortality and that these
fisheries, and purse-seine fishing on FADs, have

Significantly, the Scientific Committee advised
that high catches of juvenile yellowfin were
reducing the potential yield of the yellowfin
stock. Consequently, the Committee concluded
that reductions in fishing mortality of juvenile
yellowfin would increase MSY levels and the
profitability of the fishery.33

Status of bigeye (Thunnus obsesus)
The bigeye fishery is targeted almost entirely
by longline vessels. However, the use of FADs
by the purse-seine fishery has resulted in
significant catches of juvenile bigeye. Stock
assessments for bigeye were conducted and
reviewed by the WCPFC Scientific Committee
almost every year since its establishment.
These assessments have consistently raised
concerns about the levels of fishing mortality
on bigeye. Each assessment has indicated that
overfishing on bigeye was occurring,34 and each
Scientific Committee recommended that fishing
mortality be reduced.35
The 2011 assessment indicated a change from
previous ones and noted that purse-seine
fisheries and other surface fisheries now have
an equal or greater impact on the overall bigeye
stock compared to longline fisheries. This
shift from longline as the dominant impact to
purse seine reflects the significant increases in
purse-seine effort in recent years. Purse-seine
fisheries and the Philippine and Indonesian
domestic fisheries have a substantial impact in
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the western equatorial and, to a lesser extent,
the eastern equatorial regions. The assessment
also noted that Japanese coastal pole-and-line
and purse-seine fisheries have a significant
impact on biomass levels in their home region.36
Following the assessment, the 2011 Scientific
Committee recommended a 39% reduction
in fishing mortality on 2004 levels (or 28% on
average of 2001-04). Alternatively, the Scientific
Committee recommended a reduction of 32%
from 2006–09 levels.37 As with yellowfin, the
assessment found that high catches of juvenile
bigeye were reducing the potential yield of
the bigeye stock. Consequently, the Scientific
Committee concluded that reductions in fishing
mortality of juvenile bigeye would increase
MSY levels and the profitability of the fishery.38
In summary, the scientific assessments
suggest that bigeye stocks are experiencing
overfishing and may be overfished, and
that high levels of catches of juvenile

PHOTO: MAKOTO HIROSE / SEAPICS.COM

bigeye were undermining the productivity
of the fishery, and its profitability. The
assessments indicate that serious reductions

are required across all gears, particularly
in the surface and purse-seine fisheries.

Ecosystem issues and associated and dependent species
The WCPO tuna fisheries also impact more
broadly on the WCPO oceanic ecosystem.
There is considerable concern regarding these
impacts, particularly in regard to associated and
dependent species. Some nontarget species
of fish and shark are captured incidentally and
retained for subsequent use. Other nontarget
species are captured incidentally but have
little or no commercial value and are therefore
discarded by the vessel. These discards can
include seabirds, turtles, cetaceans, and sharks
and various species of fish that may be of little
interest to a fishing vessel focused on a specific
market or processing factory.39
In the WCPO tuna fisheries, the purse-seine and
longline gears have the largest incidental catch,
while pole and line is far more selective and

tends to take only small amounts of mahimahi,
rainbow runners, and nontarget tunas (although
pole and line can cause significant impacts
if baitfish supply fisheries are not effectively
managed).40 Key concerns for the purse-seine
and longline fleets relate to the potential
impacts of incidental catch on vulnerable
species (i.e., seabirds, cetaceans, turtles, and
sharks).41
The use of FADs by purse-seine fleets has also
raised serious conservation concerns. Purseseine sets on schools associated with FADs
and logs will catch smaller fish, particularly
juvenile yellowfin and bigeye, whereas sets
on unassociated free-swimming schools (i.e.,
non-FAD sets) will catch larger skipjack and/
or adult yellowfin.42 Proponents argue that
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FADs have increased the efficiency of purse
seining,43 while others note that the significant
reduction in the size of fish caught undermines
the efficiency gains.44
In addition to their significant impacts on
bigeye and high levels of juvenile catch,
scientists have raised concerns that the use
of FADs may be creating an ‘ecological trap’.45

An ecological trap is an event wherein growth
is reduced due to individuals making poor
habitat choices. Studies have suggested that
tuna associated with FADs are less healthy than
those in unassociated free-swimming schools.46
It has also been pointed out that the use of
FADs is introducing further uncertainties into
scientific assessments due to their impact on
tuna behaviour.47

Reduced profitability
Since the mid-1990s, various studies have
suggested that the profitability of the WCPO
tuna fisheries could be increased through
significant changes in fleet composition and
reductions in most, if not all, fleets.48 Among
other things, these studies have suggested
that fishing capacity is significantly above
optimal levels, thereby reducing the profitability
of the WCPO tuna fisheries. In addition, the
current fleet composition (i.e., mix of gears)
does not necessarily maximise the benefit
from WCPO tuna fisheries. Catches of bigeye
and yellowfin by purse-seine fishing vessels,
particularly juveniles in schools associated
with FADs, provide a smaller benefit to the
overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries than
would be achieved if these fish had been
allowed to mature and then be caught by
longline. The overall benefit from the WCPO
tuna fisheries would be significantly higher
if these tuna were caught in a manner (such
as by longline) that allowed their maximum
value to be reached. If purse seiners had been
prohibited from setting on schools associated
with FADs and were able to otherwise avoid
all catches of bigeye, then these fish may
potentially have become available to the
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longline fishery for a far greater benefit to the
overall value of the WCPO tuna fisheries.
Reducing overcapacity or changing fleet
and species compositions would likely
maximise the benefit from the WCPO tuna
fisheries and deliver significant conservation
outcomes. Bioeconomic modelling has
indicated that reductions of 50 to 68% in
fishing effort levels (particularly in purseseine fleets) would significantly increase
the profitability of the combined WCPO
tuna fisheries and maximise the total
resource rents across the whole region.49
However, such reductions would also transfer
benefits from States with significant purseseine interests to those with significant
longline interests. Bioeconomic modelling has
found that the benefits from significant fleet
restructuring and purse-seine reductions would
be enjoyed disproportionately and that the
actual outcomes could be detrimental to coastal
States with significant purse-seine fisheries.50
Consequently, any resolution of overcapacity
and fleet structures will likely require some
mechanism to equitably distribute the
reductions and benefits.

Part Two: Interests and Influence
It is critically important that the skipjack,
yellowfin, and bigeye fisheries are managed
effectively throughout their range—within
and between EEZs and on the high seas.
Unrestrained exploitation in a particular
EEZ or on the high seas has the potential to
significantly affect catches elsewhere with
potentially devastating consequences for
developing coastal States, some of which have
few alternative resources.
The intermeshed characteristics of the WCPO
tropical tuna fisheries make it difficult for the
WCPFC to sufficiently reduce fishing mortality
of bigeye, and restrain fishing mortality for
yellowfin, without significantly impacting on
fishing activities for skipjack. For example,
purse seiners primarily target skipjack, and to a
lesser degree yellowfin, but also catch bigeye
incidentally. While the incidental catch of bigeye
by purse-seine fleets accounts for a very small
percentage (1 to 3%) of the total purse-seine
catch, it nevertheless has a significant impact on
bigeye stocks due to the sheer size of this catch.
For the WCPFC to resolve the threat to bigeye,
it must restrict the operation of purse-seine
vessels that are targeting highly productive
skipjack that are not currently threatened by
overfishing. However, purse-seine fleets will
receive little or no long-term sustainability
benefit or increase in profitability if bigeye
stocks rebuild. Longline fleets will directly
benefit from conservation measures that
rebuild bigeye stocks as this will increase
the profitability of longline fleets through
improvements to their CPUE.

This creates an inherently difficult and
challenging problem to solve as ultimately
the members of the WCPFC have little choice
but to develop, negotiate, and implement
conservation and management measures that
affect a broad range of fleets and stakeholders
and impact upon a diverse range of interests.
Such conservation and management measures
implicitly allocate a ‘conservation burden’
on participants in the WCPO fisheries. Each
participating State must apply costs to its fleets
through limiting fishing opportunities and
regulating their activities. In order to implement
these measures, governments must fund
national institutions to implement national
regulations and govern their implementation,
while potentially increasing the management
costs on their fleets through more complex and
costly licensing arrangements. Depending upon
its structure, the conservation and management
measure will impact directly and indirectly
on various participants: reducing benefits
for some; limiting opportunities for others;
and protecting or potentially even increasing
benefits for some participants.
To further complicate matters, conservation
and management measures may impact on
developing States that depend significantly on
these fisheries and have strong aspirations to
further develop their benefits. Some of these
States will have few other development and
resource options and will be more heavily
impacted by the conservation burden than other
States with diverse resources, large institutions
and substantial revenue streams from
multiple economic activities. Consequently,
the question of how the conservation
burden is distributed is fundamental to
conservation and management negotiations.
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Coastal and Flag State Interests
This section studies the mix of interests in the
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries in order to better
understand how these interests might influence
the WCPFC’s ability to adopt measures for
bigeye and yellowfin. This analysis studies
interests that are directly relevant to potential
conservation and management measures.

These include the interests and influences that
each participating State has in particular species
(bigeye, yellowfin, and skipjack) and particular
gears (purse seine and longline) and, more
broadly, interests and influences related to
access to fishing grounds; fishing vessels; food
security; markets; and development aspirations.

FIGURE 5.
Key tropical tuna coastal States by proportion of average 2008–2010 value of catch taken from EEZs
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Fourteen States collectively control almost
all fishing activities that impact on skipjack,
bigeye and yellowfin: Papua New Guinea,
Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, Kiribati,
Solomon Islands, Nauru, Federated States of
Micronesia, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, South
Korea, Chinese Taipei, the United States, and
China. Figure 5 identifies the key coastal States
that control access to the most valuable fishing
grounds in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries

and identifies their key interests by gear and
species. Figure 6 identifies the key flag States
that control the most productive fishing fleets
and identifies their primary interests by gear
and species. Together, these 14 ‘core’ States
effectively control the WCPO tuna fisheries and
are ultimately responsible for implementing
conservation and management measures that
directly limit or regulate fishing activities.

FIGURE 6.
Key tropical tuna flag States by proportion of average 2008–2010 value of catch
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Skipjack. Papua New Guinea, Kiribati,
Indonesia, and the Philippines control the
most valuable fishing grounds for skipjack,
followed by the Federated States of
Micronesia, Solomon Islands, Japan, Nauru,
Tuvalu, and the Marshall Islands. Japan is
the dominant flag State for skipjack fisheries,
followed by the Philippines, South Korea,
Indonesia, the United States, Chinese Taipei,
Papua New Guinea, China, the Marshall
Islands, and Vanuatu.

Purse-seine fleets dominate the skipjack
fisheries, although pole and line is still a
significant gear for skipjack fisheries in Japan
and Indonesia. Figure 7 identifies the top 10
coastal States that control access to the most
valuable fishing grounds for skipjack and
the top 10 flag States that control the most
productive fishing fleets.
Yellowfin. Indonesia, Papua New Guinea,
and the Philippines control the most valuable
fishing grounds for yellowfin, followed by

FIGURE 7.
Average value of skipjack catches by gear for coastal States in US$millions
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Kiribati, Japan, the Solomon Islands, Chinese
Taipei, the Federated States of Micronesia,
Nauru and Fiji. Indonesia, Japan, Chinese
Taipei, and the Philippines are the dominant
flag States for yellowfin, followed by the
Solomon Islands, South Korea, Papua New
Guinea, the United States, China, and Fiji.

fishing fleets catch significantly less tonnage
than U.S. fleets, China has a far higher
proportion of longline catch, and the value
of its entire yellowfin catch is therefore only
slightly less than that enjoyed by the United
States (which is predominantly a purseseine catch). Figure 8 identifies the top 10
coastal and flag States for yellowfin and
demonstrates that all of the States with a
significant interest in yellowfin report some
catch (generally the majority) by purse seine.
The Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan also
have significant catches by other artisanal
gears and pole-and-line vessels.

Yellowfin is targeted by various gears, but
particularly longline and purse seine. This
can have significant ramifications for the
value of the catch due to the substantially
lower prices for purse seine (for canning)
compared with longline (for fresh and frozen
products). For example, while Chinese

FIGURE 8.
Average value of yellowfin catches by gear for coastal States in US$millions
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Bigeye. Bigeye is targeted by longliners
and some other small-scale gears but is
also a significant bycatch within the purseseine fishery. However, as discussed earlier,
this bycatch provides far less benefit than
that enjoyed by users of longline and other
gears. Therefore, the analysis distinguishes
between the interests of those States that
benefit from targeted fishing for bigeye and
have a positive interest in the species and
those States that benefit from purse-seine
activities but gain little from bycatch of
bigeye.

Figure 9 demonstrates that Japan controls
the most valuable fishing grounds for bigeye
within waters under national jurisdiction
and that it accounted for 13% of the value of
bigeye fisheries (not including purse-seine
bycatch). This was followed by Kiribati,
Indonesia, the Marshall Islands, the United
States, the Federated States of Micronesia,
Palau, Australia, the Philippines, and French
Polynesia. Japan, Chinese Taipei, South
Korea, and China are the dominant flag
States for bigeye fisheries, followed by
the United States, Indonesia, Vanuatu, the
Federated States of Micronesia, Australia,
and Fiji.

FIGURE 9.
Top ten coastal States that impact and benefit from bigeye fisheries (proportion of average 2008–2010
total non-purse seine bigeye value)
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Figure 10 identifies States that have a
significant ‘negative’ interest in bigeye
through their control over purse-seine
fisheries that impact significantly on bigeye
but receive little direct benefit. The term
‘negative’ is used in this context as this
interest provides a liability with no benefit.
These interests must be addressed but may
require special consideration to motivate
these interests and avoid inequitable
outcomes.

Papua New Guinea and Kiribati, followed
by Indonesia, the Philippines, the Federated
States of Micronesia, Nauru, the Solomon
Islands, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, Japan,
and Tokelau all control fishing grounds
with highly active purse-seine fisheries that
impact significantly on bigeye for minimal
benefit. Indonesia, Spain, the United States,
the Philippines, Japan, Papua New Guinea,
Chinese Taipei, Ecuador, South Korea, and
the Marshall Islands all control purse-seine
fleets that impact significantly on bigeye for
minimal benefit.

FIGURE 10.
Top ten purse-seine coastal States that impact on bigeye for minimal benefits (proportion of average
2008–2010 total purse-seine bigeye value)
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Those States with the biggest ’negative’
interest identified in Figure 10 have the most
significant problem with bycatch of bigeye
by purse-seine fleets. The European Union
(Spain), Papua New Guinea, Ecuador, Nauru,
Tuvalu, and the Solomon Islands all have a
‘negative’ interest in bigeye, and gain little
or no positive benefit. Consequently, these
States receive little benefit from conservation
measures that improve the status of bigeye
stocks. In the context of WCPFC negotiations,
these States have an immediate interest in
minimising application to purse-seine fleets
and maximising the conservation burden on
other gears that catch bigeye.
The United States, Japan, the Philippines,
Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, South Korea,
China, the Marshall Islands, Kiribati, Vanuatu,
and the Federated States of Micronesia
simultaneously have a positive and negative
interest in bigeye to varying degrees. Given
FIGURE 11.
Top ten purse-seine coastal States
(2008–2010 values)

these potentially conflicting interests, these
States may experience internal tensions
as they negotiate and determine their
national interest. Regardless of their ultimate
interpretation of their national interest,
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in bigeye conservation and management
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have solely positive interests in bigeye.
These States have an interest in supporting
conservation measures that ensure the
sustainability of bigeye stocks while
maximising the conservation burden on
purse-seine fleets.
Interestingly, the States that have the most
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Indonesia
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11%
USA 12%

identifies the top 10 coastal and flag purseseine States.
Comparison with Figure 10 identifies
some States with purse-seine interests
that are not relatively significant purseseine States but do impact significantly
on bigeye nevertheless. The two most
obvious are the European Union (Spain)
and Ecuador, which individually account
for 11 and 7%, respectively, of all bigeye
purse-seine bycatch, but do not rate within
the top 10 purse-seine States. On the other
hand, South Korean purse-seine fleets
account for only 6% of bigeye bycatch,
despite their significantly larger share
(14%) of the total purse-seine fishery.
In part, this is due to variances between
fleets in the usage of FADs. For example,

vessels registered in Spain and Ecuador
have been highly dependent on FADs over
much of the past decade, as have vessels
flagged to the United States, El Salvador,
the Marshall Islands, New Zealand, and
the Solomon Islands.51 Korean fleets, on
the other hand, report a far lower use of
FADs. Similar distinctions arise for coastal
States, although there is less differentiation
between each State’s interests. FAD and log
sets account for 40 to 70% of all purse-seine
sets within the EEZs of Pacific island tropical
coastal States. These characteristics have
begun to alter since the full implementation
of the three-month FAD closures by the
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (PNA) for
waters under their jurisdiction and the
WCPFC more broadly. This has resulted in
significant declines in FAD use by all fleets.

Coastal and Flag State Influence
Figures 1 through 4 illustrate the gear and
species interests for all States that reported
catches between 2008 and 2010. Seven of the
core 14 States that control the fishing grounds
and fishing fleets can be roughly identified as
‘purse-seine/skipjack States.’ Most of these
States are part of the group of coastal States
that dominate the most productive fishing
grounds (Papua New Guinea, Kiribati, Tuvalu,
Nauru, the Federated States of Micronesia,
and the Solomon Islands). Most of the benefits
that these six States enjoy from the WCPO
tuna fisheries come from skipjack (compared
to bigeye and yellowfin), purse-seine fisheries
(compared to longline and other gears), and
licensing revenue for access to their EEZ
(compared to their vessel registry interests).
These interests provide an incentive for these
six States to support measures that distribute
much of the conservation burden onto longline
fleets. The dominant coastal State interests of
these six States also encourage these States to
support conservation measures that distinguish
between high seas and EEZs.

The seventh of the purse-seine/skipjack States
is the United States. The United States is
dominated by its vessel registry interests,
which provide significantly greater catches from
the WCPO tuna fisheries, than the catch from
within its EEZ. Although far less significant in
the context of its overall interest, the United
States also catches substantial amounts
of bigeye through its Hawaiian longline
fisheries. These interests provide incentives
for the United States to support measures
that minimise the conservation burden on
its purse-seine DWFN fleets and its coastal
longline fisheries. As an established DWFN,
the United States also has a strong interest
in protecting its historical level of activity and
would be motivated to argue for measures
that distribute the burden of conservation
across all waters of the WCPO, without regard
to waters under national jurisdiction.
The United States, the Solomon Islands,
the Marshall Islands, the European Union,
Ecuador, El Salvador, and New Zealand also
have significant interests in purse-seine
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fisheries that set on FADs. South Korean
fleets on the other hand report a far lower
use of FADs. Consequently, a conservation
measure that proposes a FAD prohibition to
address overfishing of juvenile bigeye will
have far less impact on Korean interests than
a generalised limit on purse-seine effort.
Alternatively, heavily FAD-reliant purse-seine
fleets may consider a generalised limit on
purse-seine effort to affect their interests less
significantly than a prohibition on the use
of FADs. As noted above, similar questions
arise for coastal States, although there is
less differentiation and the coastal States
have been actively pursuing a reduction in
FAD usage through the PNA FAD closures.
The remaining seven core States have fishing
interests that are more widely distributed
across multiple gears, mostly longline and
purse seine but also some pole-and-line and
other artisanal gears. They are Japan, the
Philippines, Indonesia, Chinese Taipei, South
Korea, China, and the Marshall Islands. Each
of these States is a significant flag State, while
four of these also have significant coastal
State catches. The Marshall Islands has a
significant fleet that returns more benefit than
the fisheries within its EEZ, and has a strong
interest in skipjack but also has a moderate
interest in yellowfin, and minimal interest in

bigeye. China is evenly split as a flag State
with moderate interests in bigeye, skipjack and
yellowfin. Korea and Indonesia have strong
skipjack interests balanced with moderate
bigeye and yellowfin interests. The Philippines
has a strong skipjack interest balanced with
a moderate yellowfin interest. Chinese Taipei
is dominated by yellowfin interests within its
coastal waters, while its flag State interests
are more evenly balanced between skipjack,
yellowfin, and bigeye. Japanese interests
are fairly evenly spread between the three
species, favouring skipjack as a flag State and
bigeye as a coastal State. These States must
balance the costs and benefits of different
conservation measures across their own
domestic interests when considering how
best to address conservation challenges.
The positions of the coastal States with mixed
interests in multiple gears and species are
further complicated by their significant flag
State interests. This is particularly a challenge
for Indonesia and the Philippines, which have
extensive vessel interests that extend into
the high seas. This significantly undermines
any motivation that these States may have in
supporting high seas closures or conservation
measures that prioritise conservation
reductions on the high seas over waters under
national jurisdictions.

Development Interests
Conservation and management measures may
also impact heavily on developing States that
depend significantly on these fisheries and
have strong aspirations to further develop their
benefits. Almost all of the key coastal States in
the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are developing
States. These States are ultimately responsible
for managing the majority of the WCPO tropical
tuna fisheries and implementing conservation
and management measures. In addition to their
rights and responsibilities over the fisheries
within their EEZs, they have significant interests
in various fishing activities and aspire to further
develop their interests and benefits. Some of
16
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these States will have few other development
and resource options and will be more heavily
impacted by the conservation burden than other
States with diverse resources, large institutions,
and substantial revenue streams from multiple
economic activities.
The special requirements of these developing
States were a core issue in the negotiation of
the WCPF Convention and were incorporated
into its Article 30. The Pacific Islands Forum
Fisheries Agency referred to this Article as the
‘foundation on which the Commission will be
built’.52 Article 30.2 establishes the principle

that the WCPFC must take into account the
special requirements of developing States (and
territories and colonies), particularly small
island States. In this context, the WCPFC must
consider: the vulnerability of these States
and territories that depend on the fisheries,
including food-security concerns; the need
to avoid adverse impacts on, and ensure
access to fisheries by, subsistence, smallscale and artisanal fishers and fishworkers,
as well as indigenous people in these States
and territories; and the need to ensure that
measures do not result in transferring, directly
or indirectly, a disproportionate burden of
conservation action onto these States and
territories. These special requirements, and
the importance of marine resources to the
sustainable development of these States,

have also been recognised in other globally
significant agreements, such as the Barbados
Programme of Action for the Sustainable
Development of Small Island Developing
States and the World Summit for Sustainable
Development’s (WSSD) Johannesburg Plan of
Implementation.
In this context, the small island developing
State members of the WCPFC have actively
supported the insertion of an exemption in
every WCPFC conservation and management
measure to protect the development aspirations
of small island developing States and territories
in accordance with Article 30 of the WCPF
Convention. Paragraph 6 of CMM 2008-01
exempts the domestic fisheries of these States
from the conservation limits that are prescribed
in the conservation measure.

Food Security and Artisanal Fishing Interests
Many of the WCPO coastal States are home to
coastal communities that depend heavily upon
living marine resources for food security and
employment in artisanal fisheries. Among the
Pacific islands, the tuna fisheries represent an
important source of protein. Scientists have
recommended that Pacific island governments
should increase local access to these tuna
fisheries in order to partly meet increasing
Pacific island food security requirements.53
Recent studies have estimated that 75% of
Pacific island coastal fisheries will not meet
projected food security needs due to a forecast
50% growth in population by 2030, limited
productivity of coastal fisheries (exacerbated
by overfishing), and inadequate national
distribution networks.54
Similarly, coastal communities within Vietnam,
Indonesia and the Philippines also depend
heavily on living marine resources for food
security.55 Unfortunately, coastal fisheries
resources throughout Southeast Asia are
in severe decline due to overfishing. This is
increasing poverty throughout artisanal fishing

communities and reducing the contribution of
fisheries to food security, among other things.56
The following coastal States are home to
coastal communities that depend upon WCPO
tuna fisheries for food security and artisanal
employment to some degree:57 Indonesia,
Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Japan,
the Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, U.S.
territories, Tokelau, Tuvalu, Palau, Nauru,
Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Fiji,
American Samoa, Vanuatu, the Cook Islands,
French Polynesia, Niue, and Tonga. Many of the
subsistence and artisanal fisheries that operate
in these States and territories catch significant
proportions of tuna.58 It bears noting that 11
of the 14 core States have interests in food
security for their coastal communities.
The value of artisanal catches in some
Pacific island States may exceed the value of
commercial catches.59 For example, Kiribati
received approximately AU$32 million in
government revenue from distant water fishing
access fees in 2008. However, the artisanal
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fishing industry caught approximately 12,800
mt in 2008, valued at around AU$33.2 million.
While much of this value was consumed locally
and provided little revenue, the locally based
artisanal fleets operated approximately 4,800
vessels (less than 7 meters) and directly or
indirectly employed 20,000 people—roughly
20% of the entire Kiribati population.60
Many of the States with food-security interests
must balance tensions between artisanal and
commercial fishing interests. Many Pacific
island States have implemented regulations
to protect near-shore artisanal fisheries and
prohibit distant water fleets from fishing within
coastal exclusion zones. Nevertheless, artisanal
communities throughout the WCPO region

continue to express concerns at the perceived
impacts of distant water fishing fleets on
artisanal fisheries.61 These tensions are likely
to increase if coastal fisheries continue their
decline and increasingly transfer effort to nearshore skipjack tuna and anchored FADs.
Given their food security interests, these
coastal States will suffer from conservation
measures that limit artisanal catches or
inequitably transfer any conservation burden
onto artisanal communities. Furthermore, these
States will have an explicit interest in ensuring
that key fish stocks are sustained at a level to
support continued food security for coastal
communities.

Market Interests
A number of States around the world, including
many of the core 14, have a market interest
in the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries through
their consumption of tuna products. Figure 12

demonstrates the global nature of the market
for WCPO tuna and illustrates the largest
market States (dark red).

FIGURE 12. Map of market States with interest in WCPO tuna fisheries (includes processing
States that import loins for processing and subsequent export).

0 = Significant market for tuna, but little from WCPO
1 = Consumes thousands of mt of canned/loined tuna and/or minor market for sashimi some/all from WCPO
2 = Consumes 20,000 to 40,000 mt of canned/loined tuna and/or medium market for sashimi some/all from WCPO
3 = Consumes over 40,000 mt of canned/loined tuna and/or large market for sashimi some/all from WCPO
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Tropical tuna are processed into a variety of
products, ranging from minimally processed
fresh and frozen whole tuna (i.e., bigeye and
yellowfin), through various loining stages
to fully processed canned retail products
(i.e., skipjack and yellowfin). Canned tuna
is one of the most significant products that
originate from the WCPO purse-seine fisheries.
Processing of canned tuna occurs in two stages.
Loining is where the fish is headed, gutted, deboned, pre-cooked and prepared for canning.
The loins are then canned and cooked a second
time in an automated process.
The commodity chains that provide the raw
tuna, through the processing stages, and
into the final retail product are complex and
globalised.62 Much of the product (particularly
canned tuna) is traded through a small number
of companies.63 Given the complexity of the
global tuna commodity chain, and the highly
globalised market, it is difficult to consistently
determine exactly what proportion of each tuna
product in each market originated from the
WCPO tuna fisheries. Global market reports and
industry studies do not break down import and
export of retail or processed product by coastal
State origin and only provide export data for
processing States or ‘producer’ States.64 This
can be misleading if interpreted incorrectly, as
producer States may not include catches taken
through access agreements inside EEZs by
foreign vessels. For example, three of the core
14 States (Kiribati, Tuvalu, and Nauru) report
little or no tuna export despite the significance
of their coastal catches, because these catches
are not landed.65

This analysis works around this limitation by
cross-referencing various industry reports
and secondary literature, so as to determine
where most WCPO catch goes for processing,
and consequently which States have a
significant interest in processing that is, in
part, dependent upon tropical tuna sourced
from the WCPO fisheries. However, it is not
possible to consistently determine the exact
proportion of the exported processed product
that originated from the WCPO tuna fisheries.
Within this limited context, the analysis
identifies the world’s key processing States
that land or import tuna from the WCPO, and
then assesses their interest in processing
by the significance of their total processed
tuna exports. Given that these States import
or land tuna from the WCPO, and the global
significance of the WCPO tropical tuna
fishery, the analysis makes an assumption
that the State therefore has an interest in
continuing supply from the WCPO tropical
tuna fisheries for its processing operations.
The analysis also assesses import and export
data for canned tuna and identifies those
markets with the most significant interests. The
assessment is based on imports of canned tuna
for retail consumption. The connections to the
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are confirmed
through the commodity chain, industry reports
or secondary literature. For example, Thailand
is identified as the world’s largest processor of
canned tuna. Thailand is also the recipient of
almost half of the WCPO’s purse-seine catch.66
Therefore, there is a reasonable assumption
that markets which are supplied by Thailand
canneries consume some amount of tuna from
the WCPO.

Canning and Loining Market Interests
The WCPO tropical tuna fisheries are a critical
source of raw product for tuna processing.
A large number of intermediary ports and
processing States, from Europe through Asia

to the Americas, are increasingly impacted
by landings and processing of tuna caught in
the WCPO.67 Thailand is the most significant
canning and loining processor of tuna caught
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in the WCPO. Other States with canning and
loining industries that land or import tuna
(raw or loins) from the WCPO include: Japan,
Philippines, Korea, China, Vietnam, Indonesia,
American Samoa, Papua New Guinea, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Mexico, Fiji, Solomon Islands,
Marshall Islands, Tonga, Italy, and Spain.68
Some WCPO States and territories also export
various fresh, smoked and frozen products to
global markets. Much of this requires minimal
processing infrastructure compared to canning
and loining, although some operations such
as katsuoboshi69 require significant processing
infrastructure. States with such processing
and export interests include:70 Chinese Taipei,
Korea, Japan, Vanuatu, Indonesia, Papua
New Guinea, Thailand, Philippines, China,
Fiji, Marshall Islands, USA, New Zealand,
Niue, Palau, Vietnam, Australia, Solomon
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia,
Samoa, Cook Islands, and Tonga.
While it is not possible to assess the level of
interest that these States have in processing
WCPO tuna, it is fairly clear that Thailand, USA,

Japan, China, Philippines, Korea, American
Samoa, and increasingly Papua New Guinea
and Indonesia all have significant interests in
domestic processing operations that are highly
dependent upon consistent supplies of skipjack
and yellowfin. Consequently each of these
States has a strong interest in the continued
operation of the skipjack and yellowfin fisheries
and their provision of cheap raw material for
their factories. The interests within these States
may suffer if conservation measures were to
restrict supply seasonally (as could happen if
the WCPFC were to adopt proposals to close the
entire WCPO purse-seine fishery for 3 months
a year),71 or increase the costs of raw materials,
as may have occurred following the adoption
of CMM2008-01.72 Similarly, these States
would suffer if the WCPFC failed to address
sustainability concerns for yellowfin. For those
States with other coastal State interests, this
may present internal tensions as these States
balance their interests in a cheap supply
for processing factories with an interest to
increase access and licensing revenue through
tightening supply and access.

Consumer Markets
The largest tuna markets in the world for fresh,
frozen, smoked, and canned tuna are the USA,
Japan, and Europe.73 All of these markets, to
some degree, depend upon the WCPO tropical
tuna fisheries for their supply. In addition,
markets in developing States are looking
towards domestically produced and imported
canned tuna to counter food insecurity and as
a cheap form of protein.74 Within this context,
conservation and management decisions
within the WCPFC, particularly in regard to
skipjack and purse-seine fisheries, can quickly
affect global markets and have significant
repercussions on prices.75
Within the European Union, the key markets
for canned tuna that have some proportion
originating from the WCPO tuna fisheries are
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the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, European
Union (Spain), Belgium, France,76 and the
Netherlands.77 Other identifiable markets for
WCPO sourced canned tuna include:78 Australia,
Egypt, Libya, Canada, Saudi Arabia, South
Africa, Korea, Mexico, Poland, Tunisia, Turkey,
Iran, Syria, Israel, Argentina, and the United
Arab Emirates.
These States each have a strong interest in
the continued provision of cheap skipjack and
yellowfin, and the long term sustainability of
these fisheries. The market interests within
these States may suffer if the WCPFC were
to fail to address sustainability concerns for
yellowfin, or were to adopt conservation
measures that increased the costs of skipjack
and yellowfin enough to impact on retail prices.

PHOTO: QUENTIN HANICH

The largest markets for non-canned tropical
tuna, primarily bigeye and yellowfin, but also
some skipjack in smoked forms, are Japan, the
United States, Europe, and other Northeast
Asia States (South Korea, China, Chinese
Taipei). In Europe, tuna is consumed mainly
as steaks, while Americans consume tuna as
steaks and sashimi. Japan primarily consumes
tuna as sashimi.79 As above, it is not currently
possible to consistently determine exactly what
proportion of this trade originates from the
WCPO tuna fisheries. However, given general
references to exports of WCPO fresh, smoked,
and frozen products to these markets, it is
reasonable to state that these are important
markets for fresh, smoked, and frozen tuna from
the WCPO.80 Furthermore, there are a number
of smaller domestic markets throughout the
region for local landings of fresh and frozen
tuna, and small but significant export markets
to Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.81
All the market States identified above have
some level of interest in the continued
sustainability of bigeye and yellowfin, but

none more so than Japan. Japan’s overwhelming share of the sashimi market, and that
market’s dependence on bigeye and high-grade
yellowfin (in addition to other fisheries for
bluefin), gives it a strong market-driven interest
in the sustainability of bigeye and yellowfin.
Japanese market interests would suffer if
longline CPUE for bigeye and yellowfin were to
decline, forcing prices to rise.
Much like the fishing interests discussed
earlier, the market interests of the States
identified above may conflict domestically in
States that consume significant amounts of
canned tuna, and significant amounts of fresh
and frozen tuna, particularly in the case of
Japan and the United States with their large
markets for high-grade sashimi. The United
States and Japan, and to a lesser extent South
Korea, China, Chinese Taipei, and Europe, must
balance the costs and benefits of different
conservation measures across their own
domestic market interests in canned tuna and
sashimi when considering how best to address
conservation challenges.
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Part Three: Conservation and Management Challenges
The WCPFC faces an increasingly complex
and urgent conservation and management
challenge. The scientific assessments clearly
indicate that urgent action is required to
address overfishing and reduce fishing
mortality for bigeye, halt any increases in
fishing mortality for yellowfin, reduce fishing
mortality of juvenile bigeye and yellowfin, and
develop precautionary limits for skipjack.
The conservation challenge is complicated by
the multigear, multispecies, and multinational
characteristics of the WCPO tropical tuna
fisheries. Each species of tropical tuna is caught
by each gear in a tightly intermeshed manner
that is difficult, if not impossible, to separate.
Consequently, this makes the fishery inherently
challenging to manage. This complexity is

exacerbated by the substantially different
biological characteristics of skipjack, yellowfin,
and bigeye (i.e., highly resilient and productive
skipjack compared to the longer-lived and less
productive bigeye).
The complex and intermeshed nature of the
WCPO tropical tuna fisheries makes it extremely
challenging to address a specific management
issue, such as overfishing of bigeye, with a
narrowly focused management response.
Consequently, the WCPFC and its members
must develop, negotiate, and implement a
conservation and management measure that
includes a package of management options that
will collectively achieve the conservation goal.
The conservation and management measure
must meet the following requirements.

1. It must be consistent with the WCPF Convention and other relevant instruments. The
conservation and management measure must:82
a. be based on the best scientific evidence available;
b. ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the WCPO tuna fisheries and 		
their optimum utilisation;
c. maintain or restore stocks at levels capable of producing maximum sustainable yield, as 		
qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors;
d. adopt a precautionary approach;
e. avoid adverse impacts on the marine environment and maintain the integrity of marine 		
ecosystems;
f. ensure that conservation and management measures do not result in transferring a 		
disproportionate burden of conservation onto developing State parties and territories.
2. In order for the conservation and management measure to be consistent with the best
available scientific evidence (advice of the WCPFC Scientific Committee), the measure
must:83
a. reduce fishing mortality for bigeye by a minimum of 39% from 2004 levels, or 28% from 		
average 2001–04 levels, or 32% from average 2006–09 levels;
b. reduce fishing mortality of juvenile bigeye in order to increase potential yield and optimise
utilisation;
c. ensure no increase in fishing mortality for yellowfin in the western equatorial region;
d. reduce fishing mortality of juvenile yellowfin in order to increase potential yield and 		
optimise utilisation;
e. implement precautionary limits on fishing activities for skipjack.
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3. In order for the conservation and management measure to be consistent with the scientific
advice and address the key impacts on the tropical tuna stocks, the measure must balance a
mix of management options that:
a. limit longline catches of bigeye;
b. restrict purse-seine fishing activities;
c. limit pole-and-line catches of yellowfin in the Japanese region;
d. limit catches of bigeye and yellowfin within the Indonesian and Philippine fisheries.
Conservation and Management Options
The WCPFC can utilise a number of
management options to meet these
requirements. Each of these management
options will support conservation and
management objectives to varying degrees.
However, each of these management options
will also directly and indirectly impact upon
the interests of WCPFC members to varying
degrees. Key management options include:
Seasonal closures. Some WCPFC members
have supported the introduction of seasonal
closures on the purse-seine fishery in order
to reduce fishing effort, and therefore reduce
fishing mortality of bigeye, yellowfin, and
skipjack. The efficacy of this measure depends
upon the degree to which the restriction truly
removes the effort from the fishery. It is likely
that fleets will respond through maximising
non-fishing days (i.e., maintenance, transits,
etc.) during seasonal closures in order
to minimise reductions in fishing effort.
Similarly, some fleets may attempt to transfer
their fishing effort to other fisheries during
seasonal closures. The application of a
seasonal closure is likely to significantly affect
those coastal States and processing interests
that have few options to mitigate the impact
of seasonal closures, thereby raising concerns
that such measures may disproportionately
affect developing coastal State parties.
Area closures. Some WCPFC members have
supported the introduction of area closures
to reduce fishing effort and thereby reduce
fishing mortality of bigeye, yellowfin, and
skipjack. CMM 2008-01 currently includes
provisions that close two high seas pockets

to purse-seine fishing. As with seasonal
closures, the efficacy of this measure depends
upon the degree to which the restriction
truly removes the effort from the fishery.
It is likely that fleets will respond through
migrating to other fishing zones such as EEZs,
archipelagic waters, and other high seas.
It appears that such high seas closures will
only reduce fishing mortality if the effort is
physically removed from the region, rather
than simply transferring to another area.
The application of an area closure is likely to
impact most on hosting coastal States if the
area occurred within an EEZ, and on fleets
that have historically fished within the area
to be closed. High seas closures are likely
to benefit coastal States that will experience
increased competition for access. The use
of high seas closures in a mix of measures
offers opportunities for the WCPFC to comply
with Article 30 and avoid disproportionate
transfers of conservation burden onto
developing coastal States.
There has also been some suggestion to
close or restrict longline fishing in spawning
areas. This has been identified as a potentially
effective option, in combination with other
measures that implement area closures for
purse-seine vessels and reduce effort.84 The
application of such a measure is likely to
impact most on host coastal States (if the
closure were to occur inside an EEZ) and on
fleets that have historically fished within the
area to be closed. As noted above, high seas
closures would benefit coastal States that will
experience increased competition for access.
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Gear restrictions. CMM 2008-01 prescribes
a three-month prohibition on the use of
FADs by the purse-seine fishery. Recent
assessments have indicated that this has
been highly successful at reducing bigeye
fishing mortality and has a strong impact
on bigeye conservation. Assessments have
also suggested that reductions in catches
during the FAD closure may be offset by
the larger average size of fish caught.85
Further restrictions and limitations on the
numbers of FADs that can be set are likely
to impact significantly on some fleets that
have historically used FADs more than others,
and also on some coastal States where the
use of FADs is higher than elsewhere. Other
gear restrictions are also feasible, including
restrictions on purse-seine mesh size, time
restrictions on deployment or retrieval, types
of hooks, etc.
Capacity limits. Some WCPFC members
have strongly argued for the implementation
of capacity limits to reduce effort, thereby
reducing fishing mortality and increasing
profitability. The WCPO tropical tuna fisheries
suffer from overcapacity in the purse-seine
fleet, and to a declining degree in the longline
fleet. Reducing this capacity to a sustainable
level would remove overfishing pressures and
increase the economic efficiency of the fishing
fleets, thereby potentially allowing for higher
access fees to be paid to coastal States.
However, capacity limits can be undermined
by effort creep where vessels become faster,
larger, more powerful, and more effective at
catching fish, thereby effectively increasing
capacity. Some members have strongly
opposed capacity limits due to concerns that
this would limit development opportunities
for developing coastal States and impose
a disproportionate conservation burden on
developing State Parties. In addition, such
reductions in capacity could limit demand for
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access and potentially negatively impact on
coastal State access revenue.
Catch and effort limits. CMM 2008-01
implements catch limits on the longline
fishery for bigeye and yellowfin and effort
limits on the purse-seine fishery through
the endorsement of the PNA vessel-day
scheme, and the commitment to consider
the development of a compatible vesselday scheme for the high seas and nonPNA EEZs. These two management
options provide a relatively transparent
management mechanism for directly
limiting fishing mortality. The efficacy of
these management options depends on the
consistency of the catch and effort limits with
the scientific advice, and the monitoring of
their implementation to avoid misreporting
and discards. Any exemptions or special
conditions must be considered during the
formulation of the measure to ensure that
these do not inflate the total catch or effort
beyond the recommended fishing mortality.
It is critical that adequate monitoring
mechanisms are implemented to ensure
that all catches and effort are accurately
reported. The allocation of catch limits to
national fleets and effort limits to areas has
largely avoided problems inherent with
‘Olympic’ limits, that motivate a race to fish,
but further discussion is likely to be required
to more fully allocate catches and effort for
high seas fisheries. Such discussions can
quickly become contentious given the lack
of an agreed framework for the distribution
of such limits, and the need to ensure that
any allocation of limits does not result in
a disproportionate burden of conservation
onto developing State parties and territories.
Other feasible effort limits can include further
restrictions on transhipments-at-sea to reduce
opportunities to continuously maintain fishing
effort without interruption.

Discussion
In summary, there are a handful of States
that control access to the WCPO tropical tuna
fisheries and have the power to manage the
interests involved. These core 14 States control
the most productive waters and the vessels
that fish in them. All of these States have a
vested interest to some degree in the longterm sustainability of some part of the fishery.
However, there is no straightforward interest
among these 14 States to resolve the current
overfishing of bigeye because the interests of
this group in bigeye are less influential due to
complications from three factors.
First, each of these States has a dominant or
at least strong interest in purse-seine fisheries
for skipjack that complicates any interest
in conserving bigeye. In addition, bigeye is
simply worth less in overall value (across
the WCPO tropical tuna fisheries) with fewer
States holding an immediate interest in its
conservation.
Second, longline fishers have historically
reported much of their bigeye catch as
originating from the high seas. In 2010, 87% of
all WCPO tuna catches were taken from within
waters under national jurisdiction, yet only 60%
of longline fishing for bigeye was reported as
occurring in these waters.86 Given that there
appears to be no biological or oceanographic
reason for this difference, it appears reasonable
to assume that longline activities were focused
more heavily on the high seas to reduce the
costs of paying license fees to coastal States.
Regardless of whether these reports accurately
reflect the location of the fishing activity,87 the
effect of this high seas focus is that there is
very little incentive for coastal States to bear a
significant conservation burden for bigeye.
It appears that the weak position of bigeye,
and the unwillingness of members to
compromise their interests, are key factors
in the WCPFC’s failure to adopt a sufficiently
strong conservation and management
measures. Delegations have stated that

compromises are required and that an
equitable approach should be adopted.88
When negotiations begin in earnest, however,
it appears that this spirit of compromise and
equitable distribution is rarely applied.
In practice, individual WCPFC members have
generally demonstrated a desire to distribute
the burden of conservation elsewhere. For
example, in 2008 the United States proposed
that measures should be applied to EEZs
and archipelagic waters, while arguing for
special treatment for its purse-seine fleet.89
The Americans won special treatment for
their fleet and subsequently increased the
size of their purse-seine fishing fleet to a
level far above their reported level of purseseine effort between 2001 and 2004. This
was subsequently identified in 2009 as a key
reason for the ineffectiveness of CMM 200801.90 In response, delegations from Japan,
China, Chinese Taipei, South Korea, and the
Philippines complained in 2009 that the U.S.
special treatment was unfair and that they
were not prepared to accept any further burden
of conservation on their longline interests
unless this unfair treatment was addressed.91
Japan has demonstrated similar behaviour
on previous proposals for capacity limits that
would entrench Japan’s historically high levels
of fishing effort and place the majority of the
conservation burden on developing States
and new entrants by limiting their capacity at
historically low levels.92
Small island developing coastal States have
demonstrated such behaviour with their drive to
close high seas pockets and limit the application
of measures to their EEZs and archipelagic
waters. These States oppose any seasonal
closure to purse-seine fishing across the entire
WCPO and have successfully argued that
CCM 2008-01 should incorporate their existing
coastal State management arrangements for
tuna and apply compatible measures to the
high seas.93
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The Philippines and some other DWFNs
attempted to protect their interests in high
seas fisheries by opposing high seas closures
in 2008, 2009, and 2010.94 This was particularly
problematic for the Philippines due to the
significant interests of its fishing fleets that fish
both within its EEZ and in neighbouring high
seas pockets.
South Korea has favoured measures that
prohibit or heavily restrict the use of FADs
over seasonal closures that would simply shut
down the entire purse-seine fishery for a period
of time.95 This is consistent with their fleet’s
minimal use of FADs and their strong interest
in purse-seine fisheries. On the other side of
FAD negotiations, the European Union and
other States have favoured seasonal closures
over FAD prohibitions. This is consistent with
their high usage of FADs. In addition, the 2010
proposal by the European Union to remove high
seas closures and apply a purse-seine closure
across the entire Convention Area is consistent
with their dominant interests as a DWFN flag
State (the European Union is not responsible
for any coastal waters within the WCPO).
The reluctance shown by WCPFC members to
compromise their purse-seine interests has also
been demonstrated by Asian DWFNs and the
United States in regard to their longline fleets.
Although longline interests are not as influential
as purse-seine interests, they are nevertheless
moderate to strong within the Asian DWFNs,
and significant within the U.S. EEZ surrounding
Hawaii. For example, the United States
successfully negotiated special conditions in
2008 that protected its longline bigeye interests
and significantly reduced the conservation
burden on U.S. longline interests.
After blocking longline reductions in 2007,
Asian DWFNs reluctantly accepted that longline
catch should be reduced by 30% in CMM
2008-01.96 Since then, they have opposed any
further reductions in longline catch and argued
that they will not compromise further until
they believe that the burden of conservation is
distributed more evenly.97
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Given current levels of overfishing, a
sustainable solution for bigeye will require that
some or all States agree to compromise their
interests and carry some of the conservation
burden. This raises important questions
that are fundamental to conservation and
management negotiations.
For example, given that the longline fishery will
benefit from conservation reductions in bigeye
mortality, should those States with significant
interests in longline fisheries bear a greater
share of the conservation burden than those
States with minimal interests in bigeye longline
fisheries that will receive no direct benefit from
reductions in bigeye mortality?
When considering the distribution of the
conservation burden, should the WCPFC value
the shared nature of common rights to high
seas fisheries less than the exclusive nature
of sovereign rights over fisheries within EEZs?
How might these rights be weighed against the
absolute sovereignty that coastal States hold
over fisheries within their archipelagic waters or
territorial seas? Does the immobility of a coastal
State’s rights over its EEZ grant it greater
consideration compared to the flexibility of a
DWFN’s rights? (A distant water fishing vessel
is highly mobile and can relocate if overfishing
in one region reduces a highly migratory
stock below profitable levels. In contrast, a
coastal State is vulnerable to overfishing in
neighbouring EEZs and adjacent high seas and
cannot move its EEZ to another region if stocks
decline below profitable levels).
When considering matters of food security
and the impact of conservation reductions,
how should the WCPFC consider the
diversity and choices of food enjoyed by
distant markets compared to the limited
options available to artisanal communities
in coastal developing States? Should a
consumer of luxury sashimi in New York or
Tokyo be given equal weight to an artisanal
community in Kiribati or the Philippines?

When considering how to reduce effort or
catches of fishing fleets, should a historically
high level of catch and fishing activity be
prioritised, or penalised if it is considered more
equitable to share benefits in turn? How should
the development aspirations of developing
States be recognised in practice?

WCPFC addresses deeply political and
economic arguments within a conservation
science framework. This scientific framework
then becomes politicized as members propose
conservation arguments for measures that
best protect their own interests, and refute
conservation arguments for measures that
compromise their interests. Ultimately, this
undermines the conservation science while still
leaving these political and economic questions
unanswered.

The WCPFC does not currently discuss these
questions, nor does it study the interests
of its members, or the impact of proposed
measures on these interests. Instead, the

Conclusion
Given the collective failure of WCPFC
members to address overfishing of bigeye,
it is arguable that overfishing will continue
until the WCPFC negotiates a measure that
transparently recognises the benefits and
costs, and equitably distributes the burden
of conservation in a manner consistent with
the WCPF Convention. To date, the WCPFC
has failed to successfully resolve the political
aspects of this problem, and consequently,
the members have proved to be unwilling to
compromise their interests.

move beyond the conceptual level of rightsbased models and provide the concrete steps
that explicitly determine what conservation
burden each State would carry depending on
its national characteristics.

It is unlikely that the WCPFC will be able to
develop and negotiate such a response across
its plenary table without first agreeing on
a conceptual framework that provides for
differential application of measures to the
degree necessary to recognise the divergent
interests while allowing for sufficient reductions
in fishing mortality. Consequently, this paper
suggests that a new ‘discussion’ is required
that allows for the development of such a
conceptual framework. This discussion would

The WCPFC is the only regional institution with
a mandate to regulate all WCPO tuna fisheries
across their entire range and ensure their
long-term conservation and sustainable use.98
However, despite this mandate, the WCPFC
has repeatedly failed to adopt conservation
and management measures that are sufficient
to meet its own Scientific Committee’s
recommendations.
In 2008, the WCPFC celebrated significant
achievements in negotiating a contentious
conservation measure that broke new ground.
In 2012, it will need to build significantly on
these precedents and expand the application
of the conservation measure so that it fully
implements the requisite reductions in fishing
mortality and overall effort.99

“The decisions that we arrive at in order to achieve the long-term goal of sustained
utilization of the region’s tuna resources will involve concessions from all those
currently involved in the fishery. This is a fact of the situation. If the current levels of
fishing are excessive and are not sustainable, steps will need to be taken to reduce
the fishing effort in a way that does not unfairly disadvantage anyone that has a
demonstrated long-term and dependent interest in the fishery.”100
His Excellency Joseph J. Urusemal
President of Federated States of Micronesia, 2003 to 2007
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